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Abstract
Objective
The study investigates the effect on cooperation in multiplayer games,
when the population from which all individuals are drawn is structured –
i.e. when a given individual is only competing with a small subset of the
entire population.
Method
To optimize the focus on multiplayer effects, a class of games were chosen
for which the payoff depends nonlinearly on the number of cooperators –
this ensures that the game cannot be represented as a sum of pair-wise
interactions, and increases the likelihood of observing behaviour different
from that seen in two-player games. The chosen class of games are named
“threshold games”, and are defined by a threshold, M > 0, which de-
scribes the minimal number of cooperators in a given match required for
all the participants to receive a benefit. The model was studied primarily
through numerical simulations of large populations of individuals, each
with interaction neighbourhoods described by various classes of networks.
Results
When comparing the level of cooperation in a structured population to the
mean-field model, we find that most types of structure lead to a decrease
in cooperation. This is both interesting and novel, simply due to the
generality and breadth of relevance of the model – it is likely that any
model with similar payoff structure exhibits related behaviour.
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More importantly, we find that the details of the behaviour depends
to a large extent on the size of the immediate neighbourhoods of the
individuals, as dictated by the network structure. In effect, the players
behave as if they are part of a much smaller, fully mixed, population,
which we suggest an expression for.
Keywords: game theory; network; threshold; cooperation; volunteer’s dilemma
Highlights:
• Observed behaviour depends on the size of each player’s immediate inter-
action neighbourhood.
• When the number of players is much larger than the number of required
cooperators, average payoff decreases.
• Most network structures lead to a decrease in cooperation compared to
the fully mixed case.
1 Introduction
For the greater part of a century, the special brand of mathematics called game
theory has been used to understand behaviour of social animals - including
humans. Much research today still focus on mechanisms that can push short
sighted self-rewarding behaviour towards behaviours less costly to conspecifics
and hence more Pareto effecient for the population [1, 2]. While much, but
far from all, cooperation and coordination among non-human species seem to
coincide with kin relations [3], human interactions seem more culturally loaded
with elements of punishment, reputation and normative behavioural protocols.
By providing mathematical clarity combined with recognizable narratives, game
theory has played a central role in describing the nature and emergence of co-
operative behaviour [4] within groups and populations. In the majority of these
studies, the population being studied is assumed to have no structure, mean-
ing that all individuals may interact directly with all others, at random, and
the interactions themselves are assumed to be pairwise, rather than true multi-
participant dynamics. These are all useful simplifications, as already pointed
out in [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. However, with the increase in internet-based inter-
actions (such as social media, self-organized collaborative communities, sharing
economy etc.) graph theory seems to re-emerge under the headline of social
networks, now with the additional advantage of a new empirical contribution of
large amounts of data. Comparing the system behaviour in the fully connected
graph (i.e. mean field model or panmixia) with more realistic spatial interac-
tion models, including those with population structure, can reveal the effect of
the aforementioned simplifying assumptions on the level of cooperation, see e.g.
[12, 13].
In this paper we study perhaps the simplest version of a true multi-player
dynamic: the threshold game (this claim is elaborated on below). Inspired by
[14], we focus on N -player games, in which M out of N participants have to
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decide to cooperate for anyone to receive a reward. Thus, N is the number of
people interacting in a given match, and M is the threshold, describing the min-
imal number of cooperators necessary for pay-off to take place. Additionally, we
follow [15] by placing the population on a network, in which the N -sized groups
are picked based on the connections between individuals. This is inspired by the
fact that in everyday life in both animal and human systems, an individual may
participate in several different groups, with either a high or low degree of over-
lapping members. In either case, it is quite possible that the experiences gained
in one setting are applied when deciding upon a strategy in another. Note that
we have not implemented any kind of load-sharing, meaning that cooperation
has the same cost irrespective of the number of cooperators. It is worth noting
that we still recover the qualitative results shown in, e.g, [16], where cost sharing
is included.
For those who are thus inclined, one can visualize each N -player match as a
party in which a certain number of guests have to volunteer for food preparation
for it to be done in time. If too few people volunteer, the food is never ready
and no one gets anything, hence the threshold. If too many people volunteer,
chaos ensues, reducing efficiency, hence the lack of load sharing (i.e. the cost
of cooperation does not go down with increasing cooperators). The precise and
more rigorous description of the model is given in the next section.
2 Model
The game has been chosen as the simplest truly multiplayer game. The cri-
terion for being a true multiplayer game is that it should not be possible to
describe the payoff from a match as a sum of two-player interactions; i.e. the
payoff from a match should behave nonlinearly as a function of cooperators
[9, 10]. We have chosen to focus on this property because we expect that a
linear payoff-dependence in an N-player game would be equivalent to a 2-player
game in which fitness was calculated as an average over all interactions. As the
explicit target of this investigation is N-player dynamics, we believe nonlinear-
ity to be crucial. Possibly the simplest, interesting functional form meeting this
nonlinearity requirement is a step function (Fig 1). It is worthwhile to note
here that [17] has shown convincingly that all multiplayer games with payoff
structures depending nonlinearly on the number of cooperators have attractors
qualitatively similar to what is studied here; i.e. the step function is a suitable
starting point for a more general investigation. This also indicates that that this
model has the potential to exhibit behaviour different from what has already
been extensively described for pair-wise models [18]. We think that this finding
by [17] supports our intuition regarding nonlinearity very well.
Thus, the game studied here is a threshold game in which payoff only takes
place when the number of cooperators reaches a certain threshold, M . One could
envision the dinner party described above, or group hunting carnivores where the
prey is only brought down when a certain number of individuals participate, and
where the cost, in the form of energy spent on running, depends on prey rather
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Figure 1: The reward for participating in a game with #C cooperators.
than participants. On another level one could imagine a collection of interacting
cells or bacteria producing growth factors or drug resistance compounds, and
only if a sufficient number of cellular units contribute would the common good
be manifested [19, 20].
We consider a finite population of L individuals, each with the choice of
either cooperating (C) or defecting (D). The i’th individual is represented by her
probability, xi, of cooperating. xi is called the ”strategy” of the i’th individual.
The individuals participate in N -player games, in which each participant of a
given match is rewarded r if at least M players cooperated, and none otherwise.
In this way it is a simplification of the game described in [21]. Irrespective of
the number of cooperators, the cost of cooperating for a given individual is c.
The game is a generalization of other games in which multiple players must
coordinate their behaviour. For N = 2,M = 1, this game is reminiscent of
the classic snowdrift or hawk-dove game [22]. For M = 1, it is the volunteers
dilemma [23].
The simulation proceeds in a number of rounds. At the beginning of each
round, all individuals decide on playing either C or D, according to their re-
spective strategies. During the course of a round, G matches are played, in each
of which N individuals are picked from the population, and their shared payoff
according to the rules of the game is calculated before returning them to the
pool. The manner in which the players are matched is described below. At
the end of a round, each individual calculates the average payoff per match of
all C-players and all D-players that the individual has encountered during the
round, fC , fD. We assume that the player has full knowledge of the fortunes of
these players, irrespective of how many of the G matches they actually shared.
The strategies of the individuals are then updated as follows:
xi → xi(1− xi)(fC − fD)dt, (1)
where dt is a discretization time step, equal to 0.01, while fC , fD are generally
of order 1. The update takes place after each round of G matches, such that
these are in effect simultaneous. If a player does not meet both cooperators and
defectors during a round, then fC (or fD) has the same value as in the previous
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round.
All simulations are run for 105 iterations, such that the amount of simulated
time is 105dt = 1000. At the beginning of the simulation, the xi are drawn from
a uniform distribution on [0, 1].
Simulations were run in Matlab, and extensive summaries of the results have
been made available as a mySQL database on Dryad.
2.1 Mean Field Treatment
The model described thus far has been studied with a mean field approach in
[14]. There it was found that there are up to 4 solutions of d〈x〉dt = 0 in the mean
field model: 〈x〉 = 1, 0 and the roots of
g(x) = r
(
N − 1
M − 1
)
〈x〉M−1 (1− 〈x〉)N−M − c . (2)
Note that 〈x〉 in this paper will refer to the population average of strategies,
evaluated instantaneously. The lower root of (2) and 1 are repellers – any
deviation however small will lead the system away from the solution, while 0
and the upper root are attractors, or evolutionary stable states, as they are also
called. These circumstances turn out to be important to our findings, which
will be discussed below.
Defining the parameter α = c/r, i.e. the ratio between cost and reward of
cooperation, it was furthermore shown in [14] that (2) only has real roots when
α ≤
(
N − 1
M − 1
)(
M − 1
N − 1
)M−1(
N −M
N − 1
)N−M
. (3)
Because of this, we will henceforth use α as the principal means of describing
r, c-variation.
2.2 Population structure
We implement population structure by requiring that an individual is only
matched with people with whom they are connected (befriended). For all net-
works, G = L, and, in all but the first network type, each group of N is picked
as the i’th individual and its N − 1 neighbours, for 1 ≤ i ≤ L. This matching
rule is similar to what was used in [15]. We consider five different types of
population structures, or networks:
Fully mixed: This is the standard case, in which the N players for each match
are picked randomly from the entire population. In network terms, we may
think of this as the ”fully connected” case. As such, it is the only network
type which diverges in its matching rule, in that an individual will not
necessarily be matched with all her connections in a given round. The
situation is depicted in Fig. 2a.
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Random, regular network: In the random, regular network, the population
is placed on an undirected, regular graph, each vertex representing an
individual. The degree of each vertex is N − 1. An example is given in
Fig. 2b.
Ringlike, regular network, short range connections: In this network, we
imagine the individuals placed on a circle. If N−1 is even, each individual
is connected to the N −1 individuals closest on the circle. If N −1 is odd,
the individual is connected to the N − 2 closest neighbours, and the last
connection is made to the first non-connected individual in either clock-
or counter clockwise direction. It is attempted to alternate between the
two directions. It is, unfortunately, not possible to create this network for
all combinations of N and L if N is even, which may be noticed by careful
examinations of the following figures. An example of the layout is given
in Fig 2c.
Ringlike, regular, added long range connections: Very similar to the pre-
vious type, but with added connections to the opposite side of the ring.
If N is even, one long-range connection is made, if odd, two are, to avoid
the above-mentioned problems concerning even N . It is worth noting that
these networks are closely related to the small-world networks studied in
[24]. An example is seen in Fig 2d.
Social Network: As an attempt at a realistic case, we follow the algorithm
of [25] to synthesize networks with high clustering and varying degree.
As described in the appendix, the two attachment probabilities can be
adjusted to obtain networks with a wide range of structures. An example
plot is shown in Fig 3.
Unless otherwise stated, the size of the populations are L = 300. We have
made this choice after verifying that 〈x〉 as a function of α for L = 600 is
indistinguishable from the case L = 200, meaning that any L above 200 is most
likely sufficient for the ranges of N,M studied here. All reported values of 〈x〉
are the result of averaging over at least 5 different initial conditions.
3 Results and discussion
3.1 Requirements on N
Somewhat surprisingly, we find that population behaviour does not become
representative of general multiplayer games until N is at least 4, and not 3 as
would have been naively expected. An example of this behaviour is given as
part of the discussion of 〈x〉 vs α, and is, we suspect, due to the fact that for
N = 3 the only permitted network structure is a collection of rings, which are
very different from all other networks here studied. Because of this, we have
decided to focus on N > 3 in the remainder of the paper.
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(a) Fully mixed network with no stable
connections.
(b) Random network.
(c) Ring-like network with no long-range
connections.
(d) Ring-like network with long-range con-
nections. For odd N , two long connections
are made, to preserve symmetry.
Figure 2: Depictions of the different network types studied. In each case the
connections of a single individual are highlighted. L = 20, N = 6.
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Figure 3: An example of a ”social” network, as described in [25], for L =
300, f1 = f2 = 0. See the appendix for further details on the generation and
f1, f2. All connections between individuals are drawn. Proximity in space re-
flects connectedness. Plot created using Gephi [26].
3.2 Regular networks
As was shown in [14], in the mean field model, there is an abrupt transition
between a cooperative regime in which two collective states are possible, a mixed
and a fully defecting, and a regime in which only the fully defecting state is
possible. This transition takes place as the cost-to-reward fraction, α, changes.
As will be detailed below, we reproduce this qualitative behaviour for regular
networks, with some adjustments depending on the details of the network. To
simplify things, we will often focus exclusively on the critical α value, αcrit,
at which the transition takes place. To keep things simple, we define αcrit in
a numerical model as the α-value for which 〈x〉 · N/M crosses 0.1, and in the
mean field model as the point where the mixed state disappears (i.e. where
the discriminant of (2) becomes negative). The choice of 0.1 as the point of
transition stems from the observed shapes of 〈x〉 vs. α, see later figures for
examples.
3.2.1 N-dependence
We have studied N -dependence in two cases; M static, and M/N constant. In
the static case, we focus on M = 2 unless otherwise stated. In Fig 4 is shown
αcrit for both setups, and we see an N -dependence in both cases. In the case of
the static M , this is somewhat surprising, since it means that even though more
individuals are available to solve the same problem, the chances of a sufficient
amount of cooperators decrease. We can understand this low-M behaviour by
taking into consideration that 〈x〉 will tend to decrease as a function of N , as
also predicted by the mean field model (it is beneficial for the individual to do
less when more people are there to share the burden), combined with the fact
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that the number of cooperators in any given match is stochastic:
Let nC be the number of cooperators in a given game. For a proportion 〈x〉
of C-players of the entire population, evenly distributed across the graph, the
distribution of nC is given by a Bernstein polynomial of degree N :
P (nC = k) =
(
N
k
)
〈x〉k (1− 〈x〉)N−k ⇒ P (nC < M) =
M−1∑
k=0
(
N
k
)
〈x〉k (1− 〈x〉)N−k .
(4)
We can now substitute 〈x〉 with the predicted value of 〈x〉 for the mean field
model (upper root of (2)). Fig 5 shows the result of this, and we see that the
exercise predicts the probability of nC < M in a given game to increase for
increasing N . Taking into consideration that the lower root of (2) is repelling,
and that full defection (〈x〉 = 0) is a completely stable state (there will be
no fluctuations in nC), we find that the N -dependence seen in Fig 4 can be
understood as arising from the fluctuations in nC in the mixed state. This
conclusion is further supported by the fact that when this fluctuation analysis
is repeated for constant M/N , a similar breakdown is not predicted for large
N . Indeed, it is predicted that P (nC < M) decreases. This matches our
observations from the simulations.
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Random Network, M=2
Mean−field, M=0.3N
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Figure 4: αcrit, both predicted from the mean field theory as well as measured
from the model implemented on regular, random networks. We see that for both
static M as well as relative, there is an N -dependence. However, in the static
case, when M << N the dependence is not predicted by the mean field theory.
This effect resembles what was reported in [27], in that it reports decreasing
likelihood of the population as a whole to meet the threshold, for increasing N .
In more general terms, it is reminiscent of the bystander effect [28]: the chance
9
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
α
P(
n C
 
<
 M
)
 
 
N = 3
N = 4
N = 5
N = 6
N = 7
N = 8
N = 9
Figure 5: The probability of having insufficient cooperators as a function of N ,
for M = 2, assuming that 〈x〉 is equal to the upper root of (2), as predicted
by the mean field theory. Note that the different extents of the lines (i.e. that
N = 9 covers a smaller part of the α-axis than N = 3) stem from the limitations
of the mean field model.
of the necessary number of cooperators appearing decreases for an increasing
number of participants. A similar effect was reported in [29].
3.2.2 Topology Dependence
In Fig 6 is shown the behaviour of 〈x〉 for different network topologies, as de-
scribed in Fig 2. We find that while the qualitative behaviour of 〈x〉 is the same,
the details depend on the topology of the network. We find that αcrit decreases
when the network is wired such that the connections become as local as possible.
This result is closely related to that reported by [30], who found that adding
spatial structure to a population reduces cooperation in two-person snow drift
games. However, it is worth noting that what is demonstrated here is a consid-
erably more general result, in that we here go beyond dyadic interactions, and
grid-based populations.
We propose that this topology dependence comes about through the way
in which each individual experiences the rest of the population - that in fact
clustering leads to the individuals behaving as if the population had an effec-
tive population size1, Leff < L, making the topology-effect a finite-size effect
induced by clustering. The first observation to make in this regard is Fig. 7a,
where we see 〈x〉 vs. α for both a network with only short-range connections
but large L, and a fully mixed small-L network. We see here both that indeed
small populations are prone to smaller αcrit, but also that for a given αcrit and
N , an L can be found such that the fully mixed model matches. This matching
works as our definition of Leff . It is in this connection worth noticing that
by defining the Leff based on comparisons to networks with the same M and
N , any variation in Leff must be due to effects other than the N -dependence
1Please note that, despite the name, Leff is not directly relatable to the similar term in
population genetics, as also pointed out in the conclusion, below.
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(a) Example behaviour of mean field, full
mixing and random networks, N = 7.
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(b) Example behaviour of rings without
long connections. The outlier is N = 3.
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(c) Example behaviour of rings with few
long connections
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(d) Comparisons of critical α-values for dif-
ferent models, as a function of N . ”Fully
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Figure 6: (Color online) Population average of x for various systems with thresh-
old dynamics, for M = 2, dt = 0.01, L = 300. Note that in a-c, the value plotted
is N〈x〉M , such that a value of 1 means that on average, exactly M players are
cooperating in each match.
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already discussed.
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(a) Comparison of finite size effects to clus-
tering effects
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(b) Scatter-plot of Leff vs. L
∗ (defined
in (6)). We see an approximatively linear
relation.
Figure 7: Evaluation of the finite-size explanation of the topology dependence
in 〈x〉 vs. α.
Considering the cause of Leff , we may consider the number of individuals
that a given player can meaningfully be said to interact with. We know that the
individual interacts with the immediate neighbours, of which there are N − 1.
However, due to the matching rules as laid out in the previous section, the player
also interacts with each of their neighbours (discounting herself), of which there
are almost (N −1)2. Of these, γ · (N −1)2 are duplicates, γ being the clustering
coefficient of the network. In short, we may imagine the number of direct and
indirect interactions of an individual to be on the form
L˜ ≈ A0(N − 1) +A1(1− γ)(N − 1)2 +A2(1− γ)2(N − 1)3 + ... , (5)
where the Ai are weights used to signify that the interactions with neighbour’s
neighbours and so on are weaker than with direct neighbours. As (5) is too
complicated for a direct comparison to Leff , we have instead tried to use the
same basic intuition behind (5) to propose a much simpler expression:
L∗ =
I
1 + γ
, I : number of neighbours & neighbours’ neighbours (6)
Here I is a function of both 〈N〉 and 〈γ〉, and the denominator is there
to provide additional dependence on γ, since the effect appears to be marked.
Using (6) we may test our basic intuition about the system by checking the
relationship between Leff and L
∗. Looking to Fig. 7b, we see that indeed,
Leff is well correlated with L
∗ (correlation coeff.: 0.7). We interpret this to
mean that our qualitative explanation of how topology influences cooperation
is correct. As to why small L leads to low cooperation, it seems plausible that
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it is related to small populations being more susceptible to fluctuations in 〈x〉,
which will be much more pronounced in the mixed state than in the 〈x〉 = 0
state. In other words, that the observed decrease in cooperation is driven by
the differences in 〈x〉-fluctuations within the two evolutionary stable states, like
the case was for the above discussed N -dependence.
3.3 Social Networks
An interesting question is to what extent the findings on regular networks gen-
eralize to the arguably more relevant case of non-regular networks, such as that
depicted in Fig 3. To accommodate the spread in the number of players in a
given match on such a network, we have here decided to use a relative M , such
that M = dN ·Mrele, with Mrel being a number between 0 and 1. This choice
was made because most choices of M > 1 would result in many matches having
N < M , for networks such as the one shown in Fig 3.
In Fig 8 is shown αcrit as a function of 〈γ〉 and 〈N〉 (defined as average
number of neighbours + 1). We see that a range of αcrit is possible, and also
that the primary cause of variation seems to be the N -dependence discussed
above. Note that the peculiar shape of the coloured region is due to the fact that
we are unable to sample the (〈N〉 , γ)-space directly, but are instead exploring
the (f1, f2)-space, for which (0, 15) × (0, 35) maps to the depicted region. See
the appendix for an explanation of f1, f2.
3.4 General Behavior
We see that all studied deviations from the mean field model appears to reduce
cooperation, in particular αcrit, to some extent. This can be understood by
considering the attractors in the mean field model:
As was discussed in Sec. 2.1, the mean field model has been shown to have,
for α < αcrit, two attractors and two repellers in 〈x〉-space. What this means is
that if the system is brought to cross the repeller dividing the two attractors (the
lower root of (2), the dynamics of the mean field model will dictate a transition
from one state to the other. What the mean field model does not include is
that the actual number of cooperators in a given match is stochastic, except
when 〈x〉 is 0 or 1. This leads to a certain noisiness in the simulation results, or
fluctuations in 〈x〉 as perceived by the individual, in the mixed state, but not
in the 〈x〉 = 0 state.
Hence, since all perturbations to the initial model, studied here, have had
the consequence of exacerbating the effects of the fluctuations, a higher rate of
transition from mixed state to fully-defective state is observed, most critically
close to αcrit, where the downwards jump in 〈x〉 necessary to clear the repeller
is smallest. A consequence of this mechanism is that we would expect similar
dependence on both M/N and clustering for any game where two attractive
states had this difference in inherent fluctuations. We note that, as shown in
[14], the existence of the mixed state requires N > 2 for the threshold game.
This requirement goes a long way to explain why the structure-related behaviour
13
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Figure 8: Measured αcrit for various realizations of the social networks. We
see that in particular the N -based variation is strong. The coloured region
coresponds to the (0, 15)× (0, 35)-region in (f1, f2)-space; see the appendix for
an explanation of f1, f2.
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described here has not already been extensively described in the literature, which
has primarily been focused on 2-player games.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we study the simplest truly multiplayer game, the threshold game,
in structured populations. We find that the average behaviour of the play-
ers as a function of the cost-to-reward fraction, α, is highly dependent on the
topology of the network describing the population, both in terms of number of
neighbours as well as higher level effects such as clustering. We also find that
structure appears to primarily decrease cooperation, by destabilizing the mixed
pseudo-equilibrium in favour of the fully defecting state; at least to the extent
that the resulting system can be compared to the mean field or fully mixed
models. The observation that spatial structure can inhibit the evolution of co-
operation was made earlier for the more restrictive case of dyadic interactions
and only for a two-dimensional grid implementation of space exclusively with
nearest neighbour interactions [30]. Here we substantiate the speculation that
this evolutionary behaviour is observed in a more general context, i.e. N -player
scenarios and network structures representing realistic social networks.
We find that, irrespective of the threshold for payoff, larger numbers of play-
ers in each match (N) result in less cooperation. In particular we find that for
M/N very small, meaning a relatively low threshold (M), the stochastic nature
of the game destabilizes cooperation further. Given the good correspondence
between the theoretical predictions and numerical observations in this paper, we
suggest that related scenarios (with payoff-functions that can be approximated
by a step-function) give rise to similar evolutionary dynamics.
Additionally, we find that the behaviour on highly clustered networks is
similar to the behaviour observed in very small, fully mixed, populations, leading
us to suggest a working notion of an effective population size, Leff , to describe
the behaviour for a given population structure with respect to the transition. It
is shown in Fig 7b that Leff to a large extent can be predicted based solely on
the degree and average clustering of each vertex in the network. It should be
mentioned that this effective network population size bears little resemblance
to the family of well known genetic effective population sizes [31, 32, 33], except
maybe the panmixia assumption.
It is interesting to note that we do not seem to echo the findings of [34],
who, by studying pair-wise interactions on graphs, found a marked increase
in cooperation for heterogeneous networks. While a direct comparison is not
possible in this study (since the rules of the game, and hence the expected
results, depend on the degree of the vertex), Fig. 8 does not lead us to believe
that a similar effect is at play here. Presumably this, like most of our other
findings, is due to the bistable nature of the threshold game.
The results presented in this paper show, perhaps not surprisingly, that
within multiplayer games on structured populations, there is an intricate in-
terplay between the details of the game and the structure of the population.
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However, it also bears noting that much of the behaviour observed can be seen
to stem from properties of the mean field model - especially regarding the rela-
tive stability of the mixed and full-defection states. It is important to point out
that as was shown in [14] and [17], the nonlinearity of the payoff function as well
as the larger number of players (N > 2) are both necessary requirements for
the existence of the mixed state. As such, models lacking these features would
not be expected to have a similar dependence on population structure.
Finally, it is worthwhile to remember that while the present model is surely
quite simple - it has no reputation, no kin-selection, no outside forcing - all
refined models taking these concepts into account, but retaining population
structure and payoff non-linearity, will most likely exhibit behaviour related to,
or at least moulded by, the mechanisms uncovered in this paper. As such, this
simplified model is relevant for all such other more specialized takes on the
subject of cooperation in structured populations, as was also argued in [17].
An example of a slightly more advanced model is given in the appendix,
where players are allowed to also make suboptimal choices in their update strate-
gies. It is found that the general results are still valid. Furthermore, it is relevant
to note that [15] uses slightly different payoff structures and update rules, but
still present results showing that the cooperative (mixed) state becomes less
stable when structure is introduced.
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A Network Generation
A.1 Regular networks
When generating regular networks, we have chosen the quite straightforward
algorithm of always starting with a ring-like network with an even number of
close connections. The connection matrix for this case is trivial to create, based
on the diagram in Fig 2c. If an additional short-range connection had to be
added to this, we would go about it in the following systematic manner:
1. pick 1 vertex on the circle
2. If it is not of sufficient degree, connect it to the first non-neighbour in
clockwise / counter clockwise direction.
3. Proceed to the next vertex in the clockwise direction.
We would then repeat steps 2 & 3 alternating the clockwise / counter clock-
wise decision in step 2. As has already been mentioned, this procedure is not
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guaranteed to work for all N , even if L is required to be even. We have chosen
not to study those sets of L,N where the above method did not succeed.
When a random, regular network was needed, we have created a ring-like
network, if needed with a single long-range connection, depending on the desired
degree. To then obtain a random network, it is sufficient to repeatedly pick 2
edges at random: a–b & c–d, and if the two pairs of vertexes happen to be
unconnected, to mix the pairs such that the they become connected as a–c &
b–d. This switching was done 2L2 times for each random network.
A.2 Social Networks
For social networks, we have followed the algorithm described by [25]. More
precisely, we have started with a single seed vertex, and followed the below
procedure L− 1 times:
1. pick on average mr random vertices as initial contacts
2. pick on average ms neighbours of each initial contact as secondary contacts
3. connect a new vertex to the initial and secondary contacts
In the above, mr,ms are random variables, re-evaluated for each new vertex,
by using the expressions dz + 0.05 + f1 · ve and dn+ 0.05 + f2 · qc. Here, z, v, q
are random variables uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, n is uniformly
distributed on the set {0, 1, 2, 3}, and the d·c is the rounding operator. Please
note that these expressions reduce to those mentioned in [25] for f1 = f2 = 0.
A.3 Alternative Update Rule
To investigate whether the results in this paper, principally the structure de-
pendence, depend crucially on the chosen update rule (1), we have conducted a
smaller study in which (1) had an additional noise term:
xi → xi(1− xi)(fC − fD)dt+Aµ , µ ∼ N(0, 1) (7)
This was chosen to mimic other update rules such as the Fermi update
rule [35, 36, 37], in which suboptimal decisions are possible. By varying A, it is
possible to investigate at what amount of noise is critical for our findings. In Fig
9 is seen 〈x〉 as a function of noise amplitude (A) for two different network types
and 3 different α-values. We see that the structure-induced difference persists
until complete model breakdown (when α ceases to be important, meaning that
the relationship between cost and reward no longer has any influence). We also
see that this breakdown occurs around A ≈ 0.01, which seems very reasonable
given that dt = 0.01.
17
10−3 10−2 10−1 100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Noise Amplitude
<
x>
Network Type:
Random Network
Only short connections
α value:
0.10: 
0.20: 
0.32: 
Figure 9: The effect on 〈x〉 as a function of noise amplitude (A in (7)). We
see that 〈x〉 is different depending on the network structure, until the noise
becomes so strong that the model collapses, as indicated by the disappearance
of the α-dependence.
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